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How expensive is the implementation of rural development 
programmes? 
Empirical Results of Implementation Costs and their 
Consideration in Cost-Effectiveness Analyses 
Barbara Fährmann, Grajewski 
 
Abstract 
The present paper refers to the results from the evaluation of rural development programmes (RDPs) 
of five German states. It is focussed on two issues. The first is to develop a methodological approach 
for determining the implementation costs (ICs). The second is the discussion of their relevance in the 
context of the implementation of rural development policies presenting selected empirical results. The 
cost-impact synopsis (CIS) is a wider approach to relate the measure-specific implementation costs 
and  disbursed  funds,  based  on  implementation  cost  classes,  with  achieved  impact  levels.  The 
principles guiding the discussion are two theses: (1) High implementation costs increase the overall 
cost of the programme and thus reduce funding efficiency, (2) High implementation costs increase the 
use efficiency of the programmes because they are associated with more targeted, more effective 
measures.  Sample  analytical  results  for  different  study  levels  show  that  the  empirical  results  lie 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
 
Keywords: Implementation costs, Rural Development Programmes, Evaluation 
 
JEL classification: H83, Q18 
1.  INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
Rural  development  programmes  (RDPs)  are  the  primary  support  instrument  for  rural  areas 
within the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Due to the federal structure of 
Germany, the individual federal states are responsible for drawing up and implementing their own 
RDPs. Consequently, the RDPs in German vary in structure, financial compositions and organisational 
set-up. Activities supported within RDPs are characterised by differing intervention logic: sectoral 
measures (e.g. farm investment schemes, vocational training), maintenance of the agri-environment 
(e.g. less-favoured-areas or agri-environment schemes) and development of rural regions (e.g. village 
renewal, land consolidation).  
The present paper is based on the experiences and results gained from the ex-post evaluation, 
completed in December 2008 (LR, 2008) of the RDPs of five German states for the 2000 - 2006 
programming period.
1 It has two parts. The first concerns the development of a methodology for 
determining public transaction costs. The second is a discussion of the relevance of such costs in the 
context of the effective implementation of rural development policies and empirical results
.2 
Since the ex-post evaluation concerns only that part of the wider concept of transaction costs 
(OECD, 2007) which is related to the implementation of RDPs, the term “implementation costs” (ICs) 
                                                       
 
 
1 Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen; NI), North-Rhine Westphalia (Nordrhein-Westfalen; NRW), Schleswig-Holstein (SH), Hesse (Hessen; HE) 
and Hamburg (HH). 
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will be employed instead in the following. It excludes both the costs of political agenda-setting and of 
private participation. ICs are primarily defined as the costs at the level of the German states that arise 
from 
1. personnel input by the public authorities, agencies and entities charged with implementing the 
RDP (operational staff, technical and administrative support)
3 for measure-specific tasks as well 
as for cross-functional tasks, called programme overhead
4, 
2. the costs of contractors to whom tasks are delegated, such as banks, engineering consultants
5. 
Further, a distinction is drawn between absolute and relative implementation costs. The latter is 
defined  as  the  ratio  of  ICs  to  public  expenditure  (ICs/public  expenditure)  that  is  an  indicator  of 
implementation efficiency.  
2.  IMPLEMENTATION COSTS: BACKGROUND AND STATUS QUO 
The implementation of policy measures per se gives rise to ICs. In the field of EU-co-financed 
programmes, with their highly complex implementation regulations, ICs are the subject of endless 
debate. 
Thus,  the  Second  European  Conference  on  Rural  Development,  held  in  Salzburg  in  2003, 
concluded with demands for a simplification of the CAP (CEC, 2003).
6 The current state of play of the 
main initiatives (i.e. the Simplification Action Plan, created in 2006, the new proposal of DG Agri on 
the tolerable risk of error) in this field can be found in Commission Communication “A simplified 
CAP for Europe – A success for all” and in the Commission Working Document on the 39 suggested 
simplifications currently being discussed (CEC, 2009a; CEC, 2009b). 
Also,  the  Member  States  believe  that  EU  regulations  (especially  concerning  control  and 
financing) are counteracting efforts to cut down on red tape and streamline, modernise and reduce 
public administration. In this context, ICs in general have acquired a negative connotation. Reducing 
them has increasingly become an objective in itself, uncoupled from the intended objectives of policy 
measures. While the importance of ICs in policy choice is recognised, they are rarely, if ever, taken 
into account (OECD, 2007). 
In the literature, the issue of ICs is tackled in the context of individual RDP measures but not of 
entire programmes: thus, there are studies of agri-environment measures (AEMs) and farm investment 
aid schemes (Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Falconer and Whitby, 1999; Mann, 2000; Mann, 2001; 
Vatn et al., 2002). In part, these studies concentrate on private transaction costs. 
Only a few studies exist which examine the ICs of a wider range of support measures within the 
CAP. They have mainly been conducted by national auditing agencies, which use the magnitude of the 
relative ICs (see above) as their main criterion, but seldom relate them to the specific objectives of the 
measures or to the resulting impact. The difficulty with this approach is that it might lead to the 
                                                       
 
 
3 Costs arising at the Federal German or EU level are ignored. 
4 Programme overhead primarily covers managing authorities, certifying bodies and any other coordination task concerning the entire 
programme. 
5 The acquisition and on-site checking of contractual nature conservation schemes and the implementation of public infrastructure schemes 
are often delegated, for example. 
6 “A significant simplification of EU rural development policy is both necessary and urgent. Delivery must be based on one programming, 
financing and control system tailored to the needs of rural development” (CEC, 2003). Ancona - 122
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conclusion that measures having low relative ICs are favourable, whereas those with a high ratio 
should be phased out, regardless of their impacts (LRH, 2002). 
The bulk of the above-mentioned simplification activities focus on private costs, e.g. “Farmers 
and other economic operators in the agricultural sector should be relieved from red-tape and baseless 
requirements” (CEC, 2009b). This is why the proposed measurement of the administrative burden 
arising from the CAP concentrates on the costs incurred by the beneficiaries of direct payments and 
RDP measures.  
A central task of the ex-post evaluation of RDP 2000 to 2006 was to assess the efficiency of 
both the entire programme and its measures. Efficiency is defined as the ratio of the costs incurred – 
including public expenditure and ICs – to the results achieved with respect to the stated objectives. 
Owing to the lack of quantitative information about ICs and their influence on programme decisions, 
the focus was placed on conducting a methodological and empirical analysis of ICs as a way of 
evaluating RDPs.  
For several reasons, public ICs and their relation to the effectiveness of measures are especially 
relevant to RDPs. Unlike private transaction costs, they are not co-financed by the EU and so they are 
borne solely by the state administrations. At the same time, these administrations are under severe 
pressure to economise and have experienced extensive personnel reductions. If targeted measures are 
more expensive on account of specific EU implementation rules, they are less competitive than those 
“lean” measures which can be standardised and so they become less acceptable to the implementing 
administrative bodies.  
We therefore studied the following key questions:  
·  What is the best method for determining the ICs of the various RDP measures? Does cost-
performance accounting of the various agencies and authorities involved yield useful data? 
·  What is the magnitude of the ICs resulting from the implementation of the RDPs and measures?  
·  What are the main determinants of IC and is there a trade-off between the impacts of several 
measures and the magnitude of their ICs? 
3.  THE CONCEPT OF QUALITATIVE COST-IMPACT SYNOPSIS (CIS) 
The  ideal  methodology  for  evaluating  the  cost-effectiveness  would  take  the  form  of  a 
quantitative cost-effectiveness analysis, as outlined in the MEANS collection (EC, 1999). For several 
reasons, we made two modifications to this approach. 1) The cost assessments include the ICs. 2) The 
impacts were categorized on an ordinal scale at programme level
7
 instead of quantitatively.  
Qualitative cost-impact synopsis (CIS) is an enhancement of the multiple-item impact analysis 
employed in previous evaluation studies (Fährmann et al., 2005). Qualitative CIS has three main 
components (see Figure 1).  
                                                       
 
 
7  This approach is described in detail in Grajewski and Schrader (2004) and LR (2008). Ancona - 122
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Figure 1:   Structure and flow of qualitative cost-impact synopsis (CIS) 
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As shown in Figure 1, the various building blocks comprise different steps: 
·  1a) Quantitative analysis of ICs seeks to determine the absolute and relative magnitude of ICs. 
This analysis, which is a direct-measurement approach, should be based on data from cost-
performance accounting (CPA) in the administrations. Previous methods have relied either on 
direct or indirect estimates and have various disadvantages. The use of organisational charts 
(indirect estimates) for allocating the organisation’s budget to different tasks and measures is 
insufficiently detailed or precise. Direct estimates obtained by interviewing the employees in the 
administrative units run the risk of delivering biased results. As they are based on self-appraisal 
by the interviewees, they tend to be a “declaration of auto efficiency” in that they understate or 
exaggerate input in order to demonstrate a given level of overwork (Mann, 2000; OECD, 2007). 
Moreover, this approach is quite time-consuming given that, in certain states, more than 150 
committing agencies are involved in implementation tasks (for more details see Mann, 2000; 
OECD 2007; Fährmann and Grajewski, 2009). The advantages and disadvantages of using CPA 
data and the actual mix of data and methods employed are discussed in more detail in Point 4. 
The relative ICs were determined from data supplied by the paying agencies at the measures 
level and, where possible, the sub-measures level. 
·  1b)  Qualitative  analysis  of  ICs  identifies  the  main  determinants  of  ICs.  For  this  purpose, 
empirical results (1a) and written expert consultations (mainly members of the certifying body, 
the  paying  agencies  and  managing  authorities)  are  used  to  identify  the  characteristics  and 
structural factors which are common to those measures which have high or low relative ICs.  
·  2) The “Impacts” block in Figure 1 incorporates the results of the measure-specific impact 
analyses. To gain an overview of overall RDP performance, evaluation results for the impact of Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 5 of 15 
 
specific measures (e.g. employment, income and environment) were converted to an ordinal 
scale having the following levels: insignificant, small, medium and high. This classification is 
based  on  subjective  judgments  by  the  evaluators.  Standardised  criteria  were  employed  to 
harmonise classification of the impacts identified in the various measures into impact levels. 
Nonetheless,  any  comparison  of  the  measures  can  be  very  limited  in  scope  on  account  of 
remaining differences in impact classification, measured parameters and analytical depth, and 
the lack of a defined criterion for the impact levels. 
·  3) Qualitative cost-impact synopsis seeks to achieve a synthesis of costs and impacts. It assigns 
the total costs (public expenditure and ICs) of measures to corresponding “impact levels.” The 
synopsis helps to illustrate the structure of the total public costs of the programmes and the 
proportion  of  costs  attributable  to  the  different  impact  levels.  Comparison  of  the  “IC 
classification” with each measure’s impact allows the balance of ICs and effectiveness to be 
discussed and their proportionality or disproportionality to be assessed. Moreover, for some 
impact  fields  (environment),  the  study  tries  to  identify  a  relation  between  the  IC  and  the 
effectiveness  of  measures  (price  of  targeting).  The  full  synopsis  concludes  with 
recommendations on reducing specific IC components and / or strengthening the impact of 
several measures: without the latter disregarding the implications for the ICs. 
4.  QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTATION COSTS  
As already mentioned, one objective of the chosen study design was to use CPA data.  
CPA systems have been introduced into public administrations over the last decade. They are 
designed to be steering instruments for controlling costs and output. In CPA systems, administrative 
tasks are defined as results or products. Every employee must record and allocate the time spent 
working on a certain product, such as an approval procedure for an RDP support measure. The total 
costs  of  a  specific  product  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  actual  employee  wages,  overheads  and 
material costs. However, the advantage of using existing CPA data failed to be as great as expected.  
CPA-based calculation of ICs requires that all the executive levels and organisations concerned 
implement a CPA system whose products reflect activities supported by RDPs. This was not the case 
in the German states under review. The main restrictions were: 
·  Availability of a proven CPA: Not all administrative bodies involved in RDP implementation 
had CPAs in place.  
·  Reliability of the data: Due to numerous reorganisations of administrations, the merging of 
several agencies, the conversion of public administrations into publicly-owned enterprises and 
the  abolition  of  entire  executive  levels,  there  is  no  continuity  of  either  the  implementation 
structure or the existing CPA structure.  
·  Identifiability of the support measures in the products: The structure of the products does not 
always reflect the RDP measure. More than one measure might be allocated to one product, and 
some products contain both EU co-financed and nationally-financed measures of the same type 
(e.g., land consolidation, village renewal etc.). 
Due to these factors, the IC analysis had to be supplemented with other tools: 
·  Data correction and verification through the use of estimates and assumptions: for example, the 
administration unit concerned estimated the proportion of EU-co-financed projects and the time 
expended on them. It also did this for products in the CPA, including several RDP measures. Ancona - 122
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·  Filling of data gaps through direct surveys of personnel input. Questionnaires were used to 
gather information about the time spent on particular measures and tasks by employees or civil 
servants,  differentiated  by  salary  group.  These  data  were  expressed  in  terms  of  Fulltime-
Equivalents and converted into costs with the aid of official personnel cost tables for the public 
sector. 
As a consequence of these restrictions and their implications for the study design, data gathering 
was limited to the year 2005. At that time, most administrative reorganisations were complete und the 
support procedures largely well-established. Figure 2 illustrates the resulting mix of data sources and 
methodological approaches for the case of North Rhine-Westphalia. 
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Source: Fährmann and Grajewski (2008) 
 
In conclusion, available CPA data are not detailed or reliable enough to allow the ICs of the 
individual  measures  to  be  calculated  in full.  Field analyses  are  more  informative,  but  very  time-
consuming.  Moreover,  they  only  represent  snapshots  in  time  of  specific  situations  and  stages  of 
funding. Genuine cost monitoring of support would require continuous CPA. It would therefore be Ancona - 122
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advisable for those public entities which are involved in RDP implementation to set up their CPAs in a 
way that facilitates their use as monitoring and steering instruments which are capable of providing 
more transparency about the ICs of policy instruments. The product and performance structure would 
need to be sufficiently detailed and the CPA would need to be as continuous as possible (LRH NRW, 
2005). 
In  that  case,  the  evaluation  and  CPA  would  complement  each  other  perfectly,  with  the 
evaluation providing results for the performance measurement, and the CPA showing the costs side. 
5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Quantitative analysis of ICs 
For  the  analysis  of  implementation  costs,  measure-specific  and  cross-functional  measures 
(programme  overhead)  were  separated  and  the  costs  shown  separately  (see  figure  2).  So  far,  no 
plausible relative  values  have  been  developed  that  allow cross-functional  costs  to  be  allocated to 
individual measures. An arithmetic distribution across the various support measures leads to strong 
distortion of the results for measure-specific costs.  Coastal protection is excluded from the results as it 
is  aimed  at  implementing  planned  major  projects  and  is  therefore  subject  to  highly  specific 
implementation conditions.  
Evaluation of all available data on implementation costs, relative to the overall programmes, 
yielded the following picture (figure 3). 
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Source: Authors’ own work 
 
For the average state, ICs represent 12% of public expenditure. Figure 3 shows that, contrary to 
what might have been expected, the absolute ICs, did not correlate with the level of disbursed funds, 
but rather are dependent on other factors. Hesse is a prime example of this.  
The magnitude of the relative ICs for individual rural development measures varies from less 
than 1 % to more than 80 %.  Ancona - 122
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For better systemisation, the measures are classified by their relative ICs into three different IC 
classes:  low,  medium  and  high.  On  the  basis  of  a  literature  evaluation  and  the  above-mentioned 
average of 10 %, the cost classes were defined as follows: Low: measures having relative ICs of 5 % 
or less; Medium: measures having relative ICs of 5.1 to 20 %; High: measures having relative ICs of 
more than 20 %. 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the share of disbursed funds of the respective RDPs in the 
three different cost classes, which vary extensively in the states. 
 










0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
high (> 20 %) medium (5,1 % - 20 %) low (< 5 %)  
(*) Excluding coastal protection 
Source: Authors’ own work 
 
The cost structure of the Hamburg RDP illustrates the high fixed costs of EU funding and the 
problems associated with small-dimensioned programmes in relation to the extent of the ICs as a 
proportion of disbursed funds. On account of the low uptake of many funding measures, contingency 
costs predominate in many areas; measures having low relative ICs could not be identified. 
5.2. Qualitative analysis of the ICs 
To judge from the evaluation of the cost surveys and the interviews with the committing bodies, 
the main reasons for the ICs lie in the implementation structure of the states and in the composition of 
the programme measures. 
Implementation structure 
The following features of the implementation structure exert a particularly large influence that 
increases the ICs: 
·  Structure of the state administrative body: three-tier administrative bodies, whose middle tier is 
involved in programme implementation, tend to have higher ICs than their two-tier counterparts. 
·  Organisation of programme implementation: fragmentation of responsibilities for one measure 
across many service agencies; decentralised approval and control structures  
·  Proportion of communalised support tasks: communalisation is allied with a rise in the number 
of  agencies  involved  in  programme  implementation  and  thus  with  a  high  coordination  and Ancona - 122
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quality-assurance  outlay  on  paying-agency-compliant  processing.  Overall,  a  great  deal  of 
decentralised expertise needs to be built up and maintained. 
·  Structural  hiatuses  in  the  implementation  structures:  Experiential  knowledge  and  long-
established routines are a key to efficient implementation in EU funding. The multi-stage, major 
structural reforms in state administrative bodies that have been made since 2000 have entailed 
enormous learning costs for programme implementation.  
·  Technical equipment: With regard to EDP, not only a shortage of computer software but also 
highly-complex, error-prone software and system changeovers had a particularly deleterious 
impact. A lack of computerization leads to enormous outlay per funding case, as happened in 
connection with Natura 2000 payments in Lower Saxony, while system changeovers and highly 
complex (GIS) systems generate huge expenditure on data entry, incompatibility and training, as 
was the case in Hesse  
Composition of programme measures 
A pan-state analysis of the data showed clearly that, irrespective of the organisational structure, 
ICs were always high in certain funding measures and low in others. The cause of these measure-
specific, relative ICs is the scope of advice and support provided, the financing level of the measure, 
the level of payment per beneficiary, the type of beneficiary, a low level of equipment generally and 
the duration of the commitments. 
Table 1 summarizes the main determinants and the parameters that give rise to different levels of 
relative ICs.  
 
Table 1: Measure-specific determinants for the magnitude of relative ICs 
Parameter value contributing to …  Main measure specific Determinants 
/Parameters  … low relative IC  … high relative IC 
Average payment per beneficiary  high  middle  low: 
Share of public expenditure in total budget  high  middle  low: 
Number of beneficiaries  low:  middle  high 
Type of beneficiaries  public entities  private enterprises  private households 
Specific selection of beneficiaries  none  in part pro active  pro-active acquisition 
Administrative contracting procedure  standardised granting   -   individual contracting 
Functional eligibility criteria*  none, besides formal  -  functional, as e.g. eligible 
areas, sectoral planning, 
list of species 
* The intensity of their “negative” influence on the IC depends on the technical performance of applied IT* 
Source: Authors’ own work 
 
Measures that incur high relative ICs always include contractual nature conservation (targeted 
AEM),  Natura  2000  payments,  first  afforestation  and  forestry  measures  for  enhancing  ecological 
stability  and,  frequently,  qualification  measures.  They  also  include  the  niche  measures
8  of  rural 
development (e.g. tourism, public services). The relative ICs for contractual nature conservation in all 
states are approx. 30%. For the other measures mentioned, a combination of just a few beneficiaries, 
low average payments and a high number of local granting authorities can lead to ICs which almost 
double the total costs of the measure. 
                                                       
 
 
8 Niche measures are measures which have a low funding volume, which were not introduced until the 200-2006 funding period and which 
do not readily lend themselves to standardisation. Ancona - 122
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These  contrast  with  investments  in  nature  conservation  and  water  conservation,  rural 
infrastructure, farm investment aid, less favoured area schemes as well as untargeted AEMs in all 
states,  all  of  which  fall  into  the  low  relative  IC  class.  Due  to  economies  of  scale,  the  main 
determinants of the IC ratio of an individual measure are its share of public expenditure in the total 
RDP budget and the average payment per beneficiary. The latter is high in almost all cases of low 
relative IC and sometimes amounts to 50,000 Euros. Furthermore, those measures which have a low 
IC ratio are partly characterised by oversubscription due to attractive approval conditions (e.g. a few 
special requirements and commitments).  
The administrative units that were interviewed were asked to estimate the share of EU-specific 
provisions in the ICs. These are primarily controlling and documentation obligations. It was estimated 
that national financing of the measures would reduce costs by 10 to 30% for the bulk of the measures 
and  by  80%  for  individual  measures.  For  the  purpose  of  classifying  these  interview  results,  the 
reference system – “normal” administrative action or strict implementation of the state budget – is 
crucial. This differentiation was not systematically possible during the study. Were the latter to serve 
as a basis, to judge from results of other surveys, the extra burden which EU regulations impose on 
individual measures would likely decline. This has been demonstrated, for example, by complaints by 
the Court of Auditors with regard to certain national funding measures (LRH NRW, 2005). 
5.3. Cost-Impact Synopsis (CIS) 
The CIS expresses the measure-specific implementation costs and disbursed funds, based on 
implementation cost classes, in terms of the achieved impact levels (see also Böhm et al., 2002). This 
facilitates a final discussion of the proportionality of funding, implementation costs and the impacts 
achieved. The principles guiding the study are based on the theses previously formulated by Mann 
(2000, 2001): 
·  High implementation costs increase the overall cost of the programme and thus reduce funding 
efficiency,  
·  High implementation costs increase the use efficiency of the programmes because they are 
associated with more targeted, more efficient measures. 
Sample analytical results for different study levels (overall programme, comparison of AEM 
sub-measures, and comparison of two funding instruments for erosion control) are presented below 
and show that the empirical results lie somewhere between the extremes formulated in these theses. 
Overall programme: Impact intensities and ICs of the Hesse RDP measures 
Allocation  of  impacts  achieved  in  different  impact  fields
9  to  the  associated  relative 
implementation costs of the Hesse RDP measures fails to reveal a clear relationship (see figure 5). The 
only clear trend is found among the area-based environmental measures. High environmental impacts 
were exclusively allocated to the targeted AEMs, which are associated with high relative ICs. The 
non-targeted AEMs were allocated to the medium impact level, as the stipulations overall were less 
targeted and less ambitious. However, their relative ICs are also much lower than those of the targeted 
AEMs.  Low  impacts  were  found  for  the  Less-Favoured  Areas  scheme,  as  it  has  few  associated 
                                                       
 
 
9 In this connection, the highest impact level attained always served as the basis (socio-economic impacts, environmental impacts etc.). The 
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stipulations that have an environmental impact. This fact is reflected in the low relative ICs, since the 
application, approval, and checking procedures are very simple, compared to those for AEMs.  
Expressed in terms of area-based environmental measures in Hesse, it may be concluded that 
implementation costs rise in line with rise in impact intensity. Hesse was a particularly good subject 
for this analysis because all the aforementioned area-based measures, unlike the case for other states, 
are handled via the same chain of approval. Hence, the low influence exerted on this result by the 
organisational set-up. 
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Source: Authors’ own work 
 
Impact intensities and ICs of sub-measures in the AEMs of NRW 
The data situation in the state of NRW made it possible to analyse impacts and ICs at the level 
of AEM sub-measures. The following questions could thus be studied: 
·  How great is the variance between the ICs of individual sub-measures? 
·  Can highly effective sub-measures be identified which are being implemented economically?  
The  results  are  shown  in  Table  2.  The  environmental  impacts  are  related  not  only  to  the 
configuration of the management requirements but also substantially to the accuracy of the measures. 
Improvements in accuracy are often sought through specific target areas (eligible area), which are 
generally viewed in the various administrative bodies as enhancing ICs.  
Obviously,  there  are  sub-measures,  such  as  erosion  control,  which  are  associated  with  low 
relative ICs and high efficacy – partly because the target area is measure-specific. In this regard, the 
implementation  specifics  need  further  scrutiny  to  establish  whether  this  can  be  applied  to  other 
measures. The  relatively  expensive  contractual  measures  are  attributable  inter  alia  to  their  highly 
regionalized implementation via the communal committing authorities and biological stations. For 
experts, however, this decentralized implementation structure simultaneously guarantees the success 
of this measure due to the large consulting and support effort involved. 
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Table 2: Relative ICs and impact levels of AEM sub-measures in NRW 





Erosion control  4  +++  X 
Extensification measures based on the National 
Framework  4  ++  - 
Long-term set aside  13  +++  - 
Riparian buffer strips  13  +++  X 
Endangered animals  17  +++  not relevant 
Contractual nature conservation   33  +++  X 
AEM in total  10  +++   
Source: Authors’ own work 
 
Impacts and ICs of two support instruments for erosion control in Lower Saxony 
The ex-post evaluation for Lower Saxony included a comparison of the funding efficiency of 
land-specific  erosion-control  measures  (mulching  and  direct  sowing)  with  the  funding  of  suitable 
machinery under the Farm Investment Aid scheme, taking account of the respective ICs. The reference 
variable was the unit area (ha) of problem crops (root crops) (see LR, 2008 for more details)
10. The 
aim of both measures is to reduce the potential risk of water erosion. 
Following evaluation of the IACS data, machinery funding was used to support holdings which 
overall have but little land at risk of (water) erosion and only 17% of whose land is cultivated with 
root crops. Under the corresponding AEM, the share of root crops amounted to 32% of the supported 
land. Some 67% of land measures were implemented in areas subject to erosion (water and wind 
erosion). With regard to water erosion, the measure reached an above-average proportion of very high-
risk  locations.  While  the AEM  subsidies  per  hectare  of  about  360  euro/ha  were  below  those  for 
machinery funding of approx. 430 Euros, the relative ICs of the AEM of 17.6 % far exceeded the 
Farm Investment Aid funding of 4.8 %, due to the complicated application and checking process. 
Overall, total costs per funded hectare were nearly equal. Expressed in terms of the root crops reached 
per  hectare,  area  related  funding  fares  much  better,  since  a  high  “dilution  effect”  occurs  under 
machinery  funding.  Even  given  the  5-year  commitment  period  of  the  AEMs  and  the  associated 
mandatory annual submission of applications and checks, overall costs run to around 2670 Euros 
under Farm Investment Aid compared with 1230 Euros per hectare of root crops reached under AEM. 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The general trend is that there is a link between the magnitude of the relative ICs and the 
impacts achieved, i.e. effectiveness comes at a price. However, this is not always the case. Analysis of 
the observed differences yields great insights that can assist with optimisation of the implementation 
measures. In particular, the target areas chosen under AEMs need not lead to high levels of relative 
ICs; these are critically dependent on their technical implementation.  
The analysis for Lower Saxony has shown that it is permissible and meaningful to compare the 
ICs of different funding instruments if the costs are expressed in terms of the impacts. Analysis of the 
ICs in isolation would otherwise lead to wrong conclusions.  
                                                       
 
 
10 The evaluation approach of the two measures was too different to enable a direct comparison of the cost effectiveness in relation to the 
tonnage of soil erosion avoided.  Ancona - 122
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Overall,  CIS  can  serve  to  verify  whether  high  relative  ICs  tend  to  be  caused  more  by  the 
measure-specific  characteristics  listed  under  Point  5.2,  or  are  due  to  targeting  and  greater 
effectiveness.  
Measures to reduce the influence exerted by the listed characteristics on costs are centralization 
of  tasks  and  responsibilities,  the  introduction  or  raising  of  a  minimum  claim  threshold  or  other 
standardisation options. Especially for small-scale measures (e.g. vocational training, some forestry-
related measures), it is necessary to consider whether they could be better realised in a national support 
scheme since a high proportion of ICs are spawned by complex EU regulations. 
For  those  measures  of  low  impact,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  to  what  extent  a  more 
differentiated funding design and targeting can enhance the effectiveness, without causing the ICs to 
“explode”. If this is not possible, a general re-think of the programme on offer is needed. In no 
circumstances should low ICs be used to justify the programme. 
General actions to reduce cost factors (see Point 5) related to EU funding costs consist primarily 
in  continuity  of  implementation  structures  and  regulations,  establishment  of  adequate  computer 
systems, training of staff, and reductions in checking and documentation requirements. 
7.  CURRENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE 2007 - 2013 PERIOD UNDER THE EAFRD REGULATION 
The above-mentioned survey conducted of the implementing administrations also solicited their 
assessment of the how ICs were developing under the implementation rules for the funding period 
2007 to 2013. The vast majority of the bodies expected higher ICs. The main causes mentioned were 
increased  demands  on  checks,  documentation  and  reporting,  the  multi-level  strategy  process,  the 
introduction of the selection criteria, and monitoring and ongoing evaluation. In its own assessment, 
CEC said “at the time 2007-13 legislation was adopted, neither the costs of verifying the respect of 
eligibility conditions nor the risk of error (...) was explicitly considered (CEC, 2010). For the current 
discussions on achieving the right balance of checks, CEC has therefore initiated a control cost survey 
initiated  in the  Member  States (for  method  and  background,  see  DGagri,  2009). The preliminary 
results for the first five states have shown that, overall, the programme-specific ICs have increased 
significantly. The average control costs for the federal states in 2008 alone are about 15 %.
11 (BMELV, 
2010).  
On account of these developments, a new CIS that will record the measure-specific ICs will 
form part of the ongoing evaluation. Particular challenges with regard to improving the method are  
·  greater allowance for IT costs,  
·  recording the committee costs of LEADER (Axis 4) 
·  allocation of cross-functional ICs to various measures, and the 
·  comparability  of  the  impact  measurement,  especially  between  measures  targeting  the  same 
impact. 
                                                       
 
 
11   Some of the states have not included the administrative bodies and other steering instances in their reported calculations, with the 
result that comparability is limited. Ancona - 122
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